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CIVIL PROCEDURE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-FEDERAL
APPLICATION OF STATE LAw-FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1987)
In Pennsylvania, an action to recover damages for personal injury
must be commenced within two years.' The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, has recognized an exception to the statutory limitation
which delays the running of the statute until the plaintiff knew, or rea-
sonably should have known, of the injury and its cause.2 This exception
has come to be called the "discovery rule. ' 3 In addition to its accept-
ance in the Pennsylvania courts, the discovery rule has likewise been ap-
plied in decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.4 The recent case of Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5
1. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1987).
Section 5524 provides in pertinent part:
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within
two years:
(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for
the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or un-
lawful violence or negligence of another.
Id.
2. See Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 292, 154 A.2d 788, 793 (1959). In
Ayers, the plaintiff underwent an operation for an ulcer in 1948. Id. at 283, 154
A.2d at 788. Despite the operation, his discomfort continued. Id. He returned
to the hospital in 1957 and the cause of his discomfort was determined: the
surgeon who had performed the ulcer operation had neglected to remove a
sponge. Id., 154 A.2d at 789. The court declared, "[t]his failure [to remove the
sponge] constituted a blameworthiness which continued until such time as Ayers
learned, or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have learned of the
presence of the foreign substance within his body." Id. at 292, 154 A.2d at 793.
3. For a discussion of the development of the discovery rule in Penn-
sylvania, see Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428 (1980),
rev'd, 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981) (noting that application of the discovery
rule is not based upon wording of statute of limitations but rather on notion that
if party cannot, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, ascertain injury, the
statute should not run against him); see also Note, Application of the Pennsylvania
Statute of Limitations Discovery Rule in DES Cases, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 1149 (1982).
4. Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 822 F.2d 1268, 1271 (3d
Cir. 1987) (citing Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., 780 F.2d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In Cowgill, the plaintiff-executrix brought wrongful death and survival actions
against asbestos manufacturers for the death of her husband from asbestos-re-
lated illnesses. 780 F.2d at 326. One of the defendants raised the two year stat-
ute of limitations as a defense. Id. In reversing the decision in favor of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals held: (1) that
the Pennsylvania statute of limitations was applicable, and (2) that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the decedent should have reasonably
(594)
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presented the Third Circuit with the question of whether there is a dif-
ference in effect on the statute of limitations between the discovery rule
and fraudulent concealment. The court held that the same standard,
"knew or reasonably should have known," (also called the "reasonable
diligence" standard) applies whether the delay in bringing the suit
within the statutory period was due to failure to discover the injury or
whether it was due to the fraudulent concealment of the cause of the
injury by the defendant. 6
The Urland case involved a suit by Julie Beth Urland and her parents
(Urlands) against Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the manufacturer
of Bendectin. 7 The Urlands alleged that Julie's birth defect was caused
by her mother's ingestion of Bendectin while pregnant.8 The diversity
action was filed on October 7, 1981, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 9 Merrell-Dow invoked Penn-
sylvania's two year statute of limitations as a defense.' 0 The statute of
limitations issue was presented to the jury as a threshold matter.'l
Following Julie's birth on February 8, 1972, the Urlands suspected
that Julie's birth defect may have resulted from Mrs. Urland's ingestion
of Bendectin while pregnant. 12 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Urland con-
tacted Merrell-Dow to express her concerns about her previous use of
Bendectin.' 3 The Director of the Product Development Clinical Re-
search Group for Merrell-Dow, Richard H. O'Dillon, M.D., responded
to Mrs. Urland's inquiry by letter. 14 Dr. O'Dillon stated that his letter
was written for the purpose of "reliev[ing] [Mrs. Urland's] mind about
[her] use of Bendectin during pregnancy" and remarked that it was his
known that he had asbestos-related illnesses more than two years prior to the
filing of suit. Id. at 332.
5. 822 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1987).
6. Id. at 1274.
7. Id. at 1270. Bendectin is a drug taken by pregnant women which pro-
vides both anti-nauseant and anti-emetic activity. C.E. BAKER, PHYSICIANS DESK
REFERENCE 1205 (34th ed. 1980).
8. 822 F.2d at 1270. Julie was born with part of her left arm missing. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. For the text of the applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations, see
supra note 1.
11. Id. The court bifurcated the statute of limitations issue because it con-
trolled the outcome of the entire litigation. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Mrs. Urland also wrote to several of her physicians, the March of
Dimes and the Food and Drug Administration. Id. Her letter to the FDA (the
same as the letter sent to Merrell-Dow) stated that she had taken Bendectin "at
the approximate time when the limb buds [were] being formed" and mentioned
"the questions and doubts" she had concerning Bendectin. Id. (quoting App. at
394). The FDA responded to the letter by stating that it would refer it to the
physicians who monitor adverse drug experiences. Id. The FDA requested that
Mrs. Urland's physicians fill out the Drug Experience Report which was enclosed
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"belief, that [her] child's malformation is unrelated to Bendectin inges-
tion." 5 The Urlands claimed that as a result of this letter they did not
sue Merrell-Dow at that time.'6
In early September 1979, a reporter for the National Enquirer con-
tacted the Urlands and informed them that Mrs. Urland's letters had
come to the attention of a Florida court which was trying a case involv-
ing Bendectin and birth defects. 17 Mrs. Urland met with the reporter
and told him that she suspected that Bendectin had caused Julie's birth
defect.18 She also allowed a picture of herself and Julie to be used in an
article concerning Bendectin which was to be published in the En-
quirer. 19 The article appeared on the front page of the October 9, 1979,
edition of the newspaper.20
The Urlands testified before the district court that they were uncer-
tain of the date when they purchased a copy of the National Enquirer edi-
tion containing the Bendectin story. 2 1 However, Mr. Urland testified
that he believed he had purchased a copy on October 9, 1979, which was
less than two years prior to the filing of their.suit. 22 The edition dated
October 9, 1979, appeared on the newsstands on October 2, 1979, and
was removed from the newsstands on October 9, 1979.23
At trial the Urlands asserted the equitable rule that a defendant will
be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense if by his
own acts of fraud or concealment he causes the plaintiff to delay in
bringing the action. 24 Under this rule, the plaintiff is entitled to a tolling
15. Id. (quoting App. at 394). Dr. O'Dillon's letter also described various
animal and human tests which purported to demonstrate that Bendectin did not
have the potential to cause birth defects in humans. Id.
16. Id. The Urlands admitted, however, that they still suspected that
Bendectin had caused Julie's birth defect and consequently considered bringing
a suit against Merrell-Dow. Id.
17. Id. Subsequent to her telephone conversation with the reporter, Mrs.
Urland informed her husband about the trial in Florida and the allegation by the
plaintiffs that Bendectin caused birth defects. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1270-71.
20. Id. at 1271. The front page headline of the newspaper read, "New
Thalidomide-Type Scandel [sic]-Experts reveal ... COMMON DRUG CAUS-
ING DEFORMED BABIES." Id. (quoting National Enquirer, Oct. 9, 1979). The
article cited different medical sources as stating that Bendectin could cause birth
defects, and also mentioned various cases of deformed babies born to mothers
who had ingested Bendectin during pregnancy. Id. The article also discussed an
alleged cover-up by Merrell-Dow of the test results indicating that Bendectin
could potentially cause birth defects. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Mr. Urland admitted, however, that he may have used that date be-
cause that is the date appearing on the newspaper. Id.
23. Id. This date is relevant because the Urlands filed their action against
Merrell-Dow on October 7, 1981. Id. at 1270.
24. Id. (citing Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 92, 204 A.2d 473, 475
(1964)). In Nesbitt, the plaintiff-appellant was injured while riding as a passenger
on a bus owned by the defendant company. 416 Pa. at 92, 204 A.2d at 474.
596 [Vol. 33: p. 594
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of the statute if he can establish that he was either intentionally or unin-
tentionally deceived by the defendant. 25 For purposes of the statute of
limitations, the district court assumed the fact that the Urlands were mis-
led by Dr. O'Dillon's letter in 1972, and the court instructed the jury to
do the same.2 6 By making this assumption, the district court concluded
that the question of whether the suit was barred by the statute depended
on whether the Urlands knew or should have known prior to October 7,
1979, that Bendectin was the cause of Julie's birth defect. 27 The ques-
tion was put to the jury.2 8 The jury determined that the Urlands knew
or should have known prior to October 7, 1979, that Bendectin was the
operative cause of Julie's birth defect.2 9 Accordingly, judgment was en-
After the accident, the plaintiff promptly notified the defendant of her injury. Id.
at 93, 204 A.2d at 475. Between July 17, 1959 (six days after the accident) and
July 6, 1961, three different claims adjusters contacted the plaintiff. Id. There
was evidence to indicate that the adjusters had misled the plaintiff into believing
that a settlement would be reached once all of the facts had been gathered. Id.
at 93-95, 204 A.2d at 475-76. In fact, the adjusters had been told by their em-
ployer that no liability existed and that they should offer a small sum as a nui-
sance settlement. Id. at 93-94, 204 A.2d at 475. The court held that the facts, if
true, supported the conclusion that the defendant's agents misled the plaintiff
into believing that her suit would be settled and "thus lulled her into a sense of
false security as to timely institution of her action." Id. at 96-97, 204 A.2d at
477. The court stated the rule that "if through fraud or concealment the de-
fendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of
inquiry, the defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of limitation of action."
Id. at 92, 204 A.2d at 475 (citations omitted).
25. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1271 (citing Nesbitt, 416 Pa. at 96, 204 A.2d at 475-
76).
26. Id. at 1271. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
I am asking you to assume in this first phase of the case that the Dr.
O'Dillon letter is inaccurate and misleading.
The reason it's important for you to assume that the O'Dillon let-
ter is inaccurate and misleading is that that bears to some extent, it
seems to me, and I so instruct you, on the state of mind of Mr. and Mrs.
Urland in 1979, which is the crucial issue before the case at this point,
in September and October of 1979.
Id. at 1271, n.l (quoting App. at 351-52).
27. Id. at 1271-72.
28. Id. at 1272. The jury was presented with the following interrogatory:
Have Mr. and Mrs. Urland proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that neither of them knew, or exercising reasonable diligence
should have known, before October 7, 1979, that Bendectin was an op-
erative cause of Julie Beth Urland's birth defect as alleged in their
complaint? ( ) (_____
YES NO
(A "Yes" answer is in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Urland. A "No" answer is in
favor of Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and will terminate the
case.)
Id.
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tered in favor of Merrell-Dow and the Urlands appealed. 30
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, the Urlands' principal claim was that the district court erred in fail-
ing to "appreciate the differences in the effect on the statute of
limitations between the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment.' 31
The Urlands accepted the district court's conclusion that under the dis-
covery rule, the statute begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the claim. 32 However, they asserted that, under the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment, the statute did not begin to run until
such time as they had "actual knowledge" of the fraud and the cause of
the injury. 33
In response to the Urlands' assertion, the Third Circuit pointed out
that there are no Pennsylvania cases which have held that the "knew or
reasonably should have known" standard of the discovery rule is not
also applicable under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 34 The
court did concede, however, that language appears in Pennsylvania
cases which supports the Urlands' view but stated that such language
was used without reference to the distinction between the discovery rule




33. Id. The court rejected the Urlands' extreme claim that Merrell-Dow
was not entitled to assert the statute of limitations defense at all because of its
fraudulent activity. Id. In support of that contention, the Urlands pointed to a
previous Third Circuit decision in which the court stated, "if through fraud or
concealment the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax vigilance or deviate from
the right of inquiry, the defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of limita-
tion of action." Id. at 1272-73 (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines,
Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985)). The court stated that in Ciccarelli, it was
concentrating on what constituted fraudulent concealment and because of that
perhaps was a bit careless with its dictum. Id. at 1273. In any event, the court
pointed out that in Ciccarelli, it did not intend to suggest that a defendant would
never be able to raise the statute of limitations defense if the defendant had
engaged in fraudulent concealment. Id.
34. Id. at 1273. While it may be true that no Pennsylvania cases have specif-
ically held the "knew or should have known" standard inapplicable for cases of
fraudulent concealment, there are cases which imply such a result by applying
the "actual knowledge" standard. For a discussion of such cases, see supra note
24 and infra note 35.
35. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1273. The court specifically cited Schwab v. Cor-
nell, 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 449 (1932), as an example of where the "actual knowl-
edge" language was used by the Pennsylvania court. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1273.
In Schwab, the plaintiff employed a conveyancer to represent him in the purchase
of certain property. 306 Pa. at 538, 160 A. at 449. In a letter to the plaintiff the
conveyancer inaccurately informed the plaintiff that the property was free of all
liens with the exception of the telephone and electric companies. Id. However,
enclosed with the letter was the title policy which showed taxes as a lien against
which the title was not insured. Id. Plaintiff did not become aware of the prob-
lem until five years later when his property was sold because of the unpaid taxes.
Id. At the time the plaintiff discovered the conveyancer's negligence, he brought
5
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In any event, the court concluded from other cases that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court intended the same standard, "knew or should
have known," to apply regardless of whether the discovery rule or the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment was applicable to the case.36 The
court first pointed to Smith v. Blachley3 7 in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated, "in general ... in cases of fraud the statute runs
only from discovery, or from when, with reasonable diligence, there
ought to have been discovery."'38 The court noted that similar language
was employed by the court in Deemer v. Weaver 39 and Schaffer v.
Larzelere.40
suit. Id. The court stated, "but if by concealment, through fraud or otherwise, a
screen has been erected by his adversary which effectively obscures the view of
what has happened, the statute remains quiescent until actual knowledge arises." Id.
at 540, 160 A. at 450 (emphasis added).
The Urland court also cited Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., as a Pennsylvania case
using the "actual knowledge" language. 822 F.2d at 1273 (citing Nesbitt, 415 Pa.
at 96, 204 A.2d at 477 (1964)). For a discussion of Nesbitt, see supra note 24.
36. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1273. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
37-48 and accompanying text.
37. 198 Pa. 173, 47 A. 985 (1901). The facts were stated in the previous
report of the case. Smith v. Blachley, 188 Pa. 550, 41 A. 619 (1898). In Smith,
the defendant, a physician, was called upon to attend to the daughter of one of
plaintiffs for an illness which the defendant claimed was brought about by a
criminal abortion. Id. at 552, 41 A. at 620. After the daughter had recovered,
the defendant called upon the plaintiffs and represented to them that a criminal
prosecution was about to be instituted against the plaintiffs. Id. The defendant
told the plaintiffs that he could stop further inquiries by those in charge of the
prosecution if the plaintiffs would pay him $3,000 hush money. Id. The plain-
tiffs then procured the money and paid the defendant.. Id. Thereafter, the plain-
tiffs discovered that no criminal prosecution had been contemplated and that
the defendant had pocketed the money. Id. The plaintiffs brought suit to re-
cover the $3,000, and the defendant claimed that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. There was a verdict for the plaintiff which was re-
versed on appeal. 198 Pa. at 180, 47 A. at 987.
38. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1273 (quoting Smith, 198 Pa. at 175, 47 A. at 985).
39. 324 Pa. 85, 187 A. 215 (1936). In Deemer, the holder of a life estate in a
piece of property wished to sell it. Id. at 86, 187 A. at 215. She sought the
approval of the remaindermen for the sale, representing to them that the prop-
erty was losing value due to its proximity to a steel company. Id. Approval was
granted under an agreement whereby the holder of the life estate was to sell the
property for $5,000 (the best offer she said she could get) and place that money
in trust. Id. The holder of the life estate was to collect the interest until her
death at which time the remaindermen would collect the principal. Id. Upon
her death many years later, the remaindermen discovered that the decedent had
actually sold the property for $9,000. Id. at 87, 187 A. at 215. The remainder-
men instituted an action against the decedent's executor alleging that the dece-
dent had fraudulently concealed a portion of the sales price. Id., 187 A. at 216.
In holding for the remaindermen, the court stated: "If by any act of conceal-
ment or deceit, whether before, or at the same time or after the act is committed,
the wrongdoer hides from the innocent party the facts which would put him upon
inquiry, the statute does not begin to run." Id. at 88, 187 A. at 216 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
40. 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963). In Schaffer the plaintiff alleged that
the decedent had been admitted to the defendant hospital, for treatment of inju-
6
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The court also pointed out that it had previously considered the
applicable rule under Pennsylvania law. Specifically, the court cited
Swietlowich v. County of Bucks 4 1 in which it had stated: "Pennsylvania
courts hold that the limitation period does not commence in cases of
fraudulent concealment until the time of discovery or the date when with
reasonable diligence one would have been led to discovery." 4 2 The court
cited Williams v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp.43 as well for its statement of
the Pennsylvania rule which reads as follows:
But the statute does not begin to run where the facts are sup-
ries sustained during a beating. Id. at 404, 189 A.2d at 269. The plaintiff further
alleged that the decedent was under the care of defendant doctor, and the death
was due to defendant's careless, premature discharge of the decedent from the
hospital. Id. The defendants raised the statute of limitations as a defense. Id.
In reply, the plaintiff alleged that the statute did not bar the action because the
defendants' negligence did not come to his knowledge until after the one year
limitations period had passed. Id. The defendant doctor filed a motion forjudg-
ment on the pleadings. Id. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the reply
alleging that the defendants had fraudulently concealed the circumstances sur-
rounding the decedent's death. Id. The lower court denied the motion to
amend the reply and entered a verdict in favor of the defendants. Id. at 405, 189
A.2d at 269. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in reversing the lower
court stated, "if it is true ... that the defendants deliberately concealed the facts
incident to the cause of decedent's death and that the plaintiff could not through the
use of reasonable diligence have ascertained these facts, this would bar the defend-
ants from invoking the defense of the statute." Id. at 406, 189 A.2d at 276 (em-
phasis added).
41. 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979). In Swietlowich, the plaintiff's husband was
arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and then placed in a
detention cell. Id. at 1161. About three hours later, he was found hanged in his
cell, a victim of an apparent suicide. Id. The plaintiff took no legal action until
four years later when she read a newspaper article which alleged that the police
had falsified records of the decedent's confinement. Id. The plaintiff brought
suit alleging that rights guaranteed by the civil rights statutes and Constitution
had been violated by decedent's false arrest and wrongful death. Id. The de-
fendant county claimed that the actions were barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations because they had misled the plaintiff regarding the circum-
stances of her husband's suicide. Id. at 1161-63. Although the case was re-
manded, the court concluded that, "[t]o establish her case, plaintiff had to prove
that she delayed bringing her suit because she reasonably believed that the po-
lice officers' conduct was not actionable based on their false statements of ade-
quate inspections and having done all that they could." Id. at 1163.
42. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Swietlowich, 610 F.2d at 1162) (em-
phasis added by the Urland court).
43. 62 F.2d 924 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 749 (1933). In Williarms, the
plaintiff entered into a contract with the agent of an undisclosed principal for the
sale of certain coal lands. Id. at 924. After the agent breached and the plaintiff
learned of the principal, suit was filed against the principal for damages. Id.
The lower court held that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held the action was not barred by the statute be-
cause the defendant had concealed the fact that it was the principal; the plaintiff
had been diligent in trying to establish and collect his claim, and it had not been
shown that by reasonable diligence, the plaintiff could have discovered the facts
before he did. Id. at 925-26.
600 [Vol. 33: p. 594
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pressed and deliberately concealed from the plaintiff. Such
conduct tolls the statute, and in that case it does not begin to
run until the plaintiff has knowledge of the facts constituting
the cause of action or by reasonable diligence should have had such
knowledge.4 4
The court also reviewed Pennsylvania cases subsequent to
Swietlowich which reinforce the interpretation of Pennsylvania law as
stated in that case.4 5 Specifically, the court cited Rothman v. Fillette46 for
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that "the law is clear that
fraud or deceit tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the fraud
has been discovered by the exercise of due diligence."' 47 Additionally,
the Third Circuit cited Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board4 8 in
which the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court stated:
When an employer, through its acts or statements, lulls a claim-
ant into a false sense of security regarding the filing of a work-
men's compensation claim, those actions, whether intentional
or unintentional, toll the running of the limitations period...
[and] [t]hat period reasonably should not begin until the claim-
ant knows, or with reasonable diligence could know, of his
deception. 4
9
44. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Williams, 62 F.2d at 925 (emphasis
added by the Urland court)).
45. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 46-48.
46. 503 Pa. 259, 469 A.2d 543 (1983). In Rothman, the plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident and retained an attorney to institute a suit to recover
damages. Id. at 263, 469 A.2d 544. The attorney entered into negotiations with
the defendant's insurance company and agreed to settle for $7,000. Id. The
attorney was not authorized by the plaintiff to settle, but he forged the plaintiff's
signature on both the release form and the check which the insurance company
had forwarded to him. Id., 469 A.2d 545. In a subsequent action to remove the
order marking the case settled, the court, in holding for the defendant, stated
that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer because of the fraud of a
third, the one who has, accredited him must bear the loss." Id. at 265 (citations
omitted).
47. 822 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Rothman, 503 Pa. at 266 n.3, 469 A.2d at 546
n.3).
48. 80 Pa. Commw. 233,471 A.2d 169 (1984), aff'd, 510 Pa. 283, 507 A.2d
388 (1986). In Dudley, the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured from a fall which
occurred in the course of his duties. 80 Pa. Commw. at 235, 471 A.2d at 170.
After the fall, the plaintiff's supervisor told him to report to the superinten-
dent's office and complete the workmen's compensation form. Id. at 236, 471
A.2d at 171. He did report to the officer and aided the police secretary in filling
out some forms. Id. The plaintiff testified that he believed the employer had
filed his workmen's compensation claim. Id. In fact the employer had not filed
the claim, and the three year limitations period passed. Id. at 235-36, 471 A.2d
at 170-71. The court held that, because the plaintiff reasonably believed that his
employer had filed the claim, the statute had tolled. Id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173.
49. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Dudley, 80 Pa. Commw. at 241, 471
A.2d at 173) (footnotes omitted by the court).
1988]
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In view of these prior cases, the Third Circuit rejected the Urlands' con-
tention that Pennsylvania would not apply the "knew or should have
known" standard'in fraudulent concealment cases. 50
Judge Becker dissented from the majority's opinion because he felt
that Pennsylvania would apply the actual knowledge standard to the
facts of this case to "account for the plaintiffs' higher burden of discov-
ering the operative cause of Julie Beth Urland's birth defects after de-
fendant's presumptively fraudulent concealment .... ,,51 In support of
this view, Judge Becker pointed out that Pennsylvania had long recog-
nized the distinction between the discovery rule and the estoppel doc-
trine. 52 He cited Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd. 53 as a recent case
in which the distinction between the discovery rule and the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment was noted.5 4
50. Id. at 1274. In addition to their principal contention, the Urlands also
put forth three other arguments. First, they argued that the district court erro-
neously.refused to admit evidence purporting to show that Merrell-Dow fraudu-
lently concealed test results showing that Bendectin caused birth defects. Id.
The Third Circuit rejected this argument stating that, "because the district court
had instructed the jury to assume that the O'Dillon letter was false and mislead-
ing, it did not abuse its discretion in rejecting any further evidence on the con-
cealment issue." Id. at 1275. In support of this conclusion, the court cited
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 which reads: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
The Urlands' next argument was that the district court improperly charged
the jury when it told it to determine whether the Urlands knew or should have
known that Bendectin was an operative cause ofJulie's birth defect. 822 F.2d at
1275. The Urlands claimed that knowledge that Bendectin caused Julie's birth
defect was not sufficient to start the statute running, but that knowledge of the
causal connection between the birth defect and Merrell-Dow's conduct was nec-
essary. Id. The Third Circuit rejected this argument as well, stating, "[in Penn-
sylvania, the relevant inquiry for purposes of the statute of limitations is whether
plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known of the causal relationship be-
tween the injury and conduct causing that injury." Id. (citing Cathcart v. Keene
Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 136-37, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (1984)). The
court concluded that the Urlands were aware of Merrell-Dow's identity and its
connection with the Bendectin, and it found, therefore, that the district court's
charge was not in error. Id.
The Urlands' final argument was that even if their action was barred by the
operation of the Pennsylvania discovery rule, Julie's claim was revived by the fact
that the statute of limitations cannot run against a minor. Id. at 1276 (citing 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987)). The court rejected this
argument as well, because § 5533(b) was not enacted until afterJulie's claim had
been time barred and the statute could not revive her claim. Id.
51. 822 F.2d at 1277 (Becker, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For a discussion of Smith,
see supra note 37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Schaffer, see supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
53. 757 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Ciccarelli, see sl-,ra
note 33.
54. 822 F.2d at 1277 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker noted the fol-
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Judge Becker stated that the critical issue involved in the case was
the level of knowledge necessary before the statute of limitations began
to run against the Urlands, in view of the alleged fraudulent conceal-
ment by the defendant. 55 He criticized the majority's effort to distin-
guish Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co. 5 6 from the Urlands' case, believing that
such a distinction was "too narrow."'5 7 He pointed out that in Nesbitt the
court stated:
If the circumstances are such that a man's eyes should have
been open to what is occurring, then the statute begins to run
from the time when he could have seen, but if by concealment,
through fraud or otherwise, a screen has been erected by his
adversary which effectually obscures the view of what has hap-
pened, the statute remains quiescent until actual knowledge
arises.58
Judge Becker concluded that because the case in Nesbitt was remanded
with directions to make complete findings of fact, the above language
represented instructions to the trial court to determine whether the
plaintiffs had "actual knowledge" before the limitation period.5 9 Judge
Becker believed that these instructions, in the face of objections by the
dissent in that case, reflected "a reasoned choice for the higher standard
of actual knowledge." 60
Judge Becker also disagreed with the majority's reliance on Schwab
v. Cornell6 in which he believed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specif-
ically avoided the "should have known" standard when it adopted the
"actual knowledge" standard. 62 Because the plaintiff in Schwab had in
his possession the title policy which showed taxes exempted from title
insurance coverage, Judge Becker concluded that a reasonable diligence
standard would have fit the facts. 63 However, he pointed out that the
lowing statement: "[t]he doctrine of estoppel is recognized under Pennsylvania
law as a wholly distinct theory for tolling the statute of limitations." Id. (Becker,
J., dissenting) (quoting Ciccarelli, 757 F.2d at 556-57).
55. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
56. 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964). For a discussion of Nesbitt, see supra
note 24.
57. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1277-78 (BeckerJ., dissenting). Specifically, Judge
Becker was referring to the majority's distinction that in the earlier cases there
was no factual basis prompting a discussion of the reasonable diligence stan-
dard. Id. at 1278 (Becker, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (quoting Nesbitt, 416 Pa. at 96, 204 A.2d at
477 (quoting Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 539, 160 A. 449, 450 (1932)) (em-
phasis added by Judge Becker).
59. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
61. 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 449 (1932). For a discussion of Schwab, see supra
note 35.
62. 822 F.2d at 1278 (Becker, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1279 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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court in Schwab specifically found the proper standard to be actual
knowledge. 64
Judge Becker also argued that the majority placed too much empha-
sis on those cases which support its view. 6 5 He pointed out that Smith,
one of the principal cases upon which the majority relied, did not even
involve fraudulent concealment but rather dealt with fraud as the under-
lying tort.66 In view of this difference, he rejected the majority's reli-
ance on Smith stating that, in that case, "the discovery rule was
implicated, not the rule for cases of fraudulent estoppel. ' '6 7
Judge Becker's next criticism with respect to the fraudulent conceal-
ment issue dealt with the majority's interpretation of the Deemer deci-
sion. 68 He noted that in Deemer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court spoke
of "reasonable diligence," but that it did so in order to point out "that
[the] decedent's fraud relieved the plaintiffs of their obligation to inves-
tigate .... ,,69 He also pointed out that, in that case, the plaintiffs were
not chargeable with what an investigation would have disclosed and
that, therefore, the case "deal[t] chiefly with the depth of fraud neces-
sary to toll the statute of limitations. ' 70 Judge Becker finally concluded
that Deemer only dealt with fraudulent concealment as a collateral issue
and that, to the extent that it did, it applied the "actual knowledge"
standard set forth in Nesbitt and Schwab. 7 1 Therefore, he noted contrary
to the majority's belief, that Deemer actually lent support to the Urlands'
argument. 7 2
Finally, Judge Becker attacked the majority's decision on policy
grounds. 73 He pointed out that in a discovery rule case, the plaintiff
must use due diligence to determine the cause of his injury, whereas, in
a case involving fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must not only use
due diligence to discover the cause of his injury, but must also discover
the defendant's fraud.7 4 He argued that by adopting the same standard
64. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Schwab, 306 Pa. at 539-40, 160 A. at
450).
65. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated that none of the cases
cited by the majority were decided after Nesbitt in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted the actual knowledge standard. Id. n.5 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Smith, see supra note 37
and accompanying text.
67. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 1279-80 (Becker, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Deemer, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 1280 (Becker, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Nesbitt, see supra note 24
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Schwab, see supra note 35 and ac-
companying text.
72. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1280-81 (Becker, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1281 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated that "Penn-
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for fraudulent concealment as for the discovery of the underlying tort,
the majority has encouraged fraudulent concealment because the de-
fendant faces no additional penalty for concealing the wrongful act. 75
As a result, Judge Becker concluded that "[a] higher knowledge stan-
dard than 'should have known' is necessary both to account for plain-
tiff's extra burden of overcoming defendant's fraud and to discourage
fraud." 76
Even the most insensitive of jurists ought to be disturbed by the
outcome of the Urland case. Not only was a young child denied the op-
portunity to prove the cause of her injury, but the corporate defendant,
which was presumed to have fraudulently concealed the cause of her
injury, was permitted to avoid liability without defending itself on the
merits. Such a result could only be justified by a narrow reading of
Pennsylvania law.
A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law unless the
matter before the court concerns the federal constitution or acts of Con-
gress. 7 7 In order to apply the state law, however, the district court must
first establish what the law is by examining the decisions of the appellate
courts of the state. 78 Presumably, the district court followed that proce-
sylvania appears to have accounted for this extra burden ... by insisting on a
higher threshold of knowledge on the part of the plaintiff before the claim will
be barred-the 'actual knowledge' standard . Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated his belief that under
Pennsylvania law the statute only begins to run when the plaintiff "actually
knows that she has a reasonable basis for a claim against the defendant." Id.
Judge Becker also disagreed with the majority on two other grounds. First,
he pointed out that even if the applicable standard is "knew or should have
known," the inquiry should focus on the post-fraud period. Id. He stated that
"the existence of effective fraud by the defendant should toll the statute, and the
plaintiff should have two years to file suit after learning of the operative cause of
injury." Id. He reasoned that because the fraudulent concealment excused the
failure to bring suit in the period prior to Dr. O'Dillon's letter to Mrs. Urland,
the instructions given to the jury should have reflected that fact. Id. Judge
Becker concluded that, because the instructions did not distinguish between the
post and pre-fraud periods, the district court committed reversible error. Id. at
1281-82. For the text of the jury instruction, see supra note 26.
Second, Judge Becker indicated that if the "knew or should have known"
standard is to be applied, then it was improper for the trial court to exclude the
evidence offered by the Urlands to show the extent of the fraud. Id. at 1282
(Becker, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the Urlands had offered evidence
which demonstrated not only that they had been misled by Merrell-Dow, but
that the FDA had likewise been misled. Id. He noted, therefore, that the FDA
could not have informed the Urlands of the teratogenicity of Bendectin. Id.
Thus, Judge Becker concluded that if the applicable standard is "knew or should
have known" then the jury needed the evidence of the extent of the fraud to
determine what the Urlands with reasonable diligence could have known. Id.
77. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[t]here is no fed-
eral general common law").
78. SeeJ. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.6 (1985);
see also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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dure at the trial level of the Urland case and determined that Penn-
sylvania would apply the "knew or should have known" standard in a
case involving fraudulent concealment. Upon review, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that decision and, thus,
Julie Beth Urland's cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations. 7 9
An examination of the principal Pennsylvania cases relied upon by
the majority and the dissent indicates that the dissent's argument favor-
ing the "actual knowledge" standard should have prevailed. Although
the conclusions of those cases were not entirely lucid, they embraced the
"actual knowledge" standard where fraudulent concealment was in-
volved. The few decisions cited by the majority, where the "knew or
should have known" standard was applied, dealt with factually dissimilar
situations.
The majority placed primary emphasis on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Blachley.80 In that case, the court
stated that, "in general ... in cases of fraud the statute runs only from
discovery, or from when, with reasonable diligence, there ought to have
been discovery." 8' Judge Becker, in his dissent, argued that the major-
ity's reliance on Smith was misplaced.8 2 Smith dealt with fraud as the
underlying tort, whereas, Urland dealt with the fraudulent concealment
of the defective nature of the drug.8 3 While the distinction is an impor-
tant one, Smith is nevertheless relevant to the issue at hand, because it
lends support to the argument favoring the "actual knowledge"
standard.
Although in Smith, the court dealt specifically with fraud as the un-
derlying tort, it addressed a situation analogous to that in Urland. The
court distinguished the facts of simple fraud, as seen in Smith, from a
case in which the defendant takes subsequent actions to prevent discov-
ery of that underlying fraud. The court stated: "[b]ut if the wrongdoer
adds to his original fraud, affirmative efforts to divert or mislead or pre-
vent discovery, then he gives to his original act a continuing character by
virtue of which he deprives it of the protection of the statute until discovery." ,8 4
Thus, when the underlying tort is fraud, and the defendant fraudulently
conceals that earlier fraud, the statute will be tolled until the plaintiff has
§ 4507 at 82 (1982); Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity Case,
40 IND. L.J. 541, 542-43 (1965).
79. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1270.
80. Id. at 1279 (Becker, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Smith, see supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 1273 (quoting Smith, 198 Pa. at 175, 47 A. at 985).
82. Id. at 1279 (Becker, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Fraud, as opposed to fraudulent conceal-
ment, was also the issue in Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 469 A.2d 543
(1983). For a discussion of Rothman, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
84. Smith, 198 Pa. at 179, 47 A. at 987 (emphasis added).
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"actual knowledge" of the underlying fraud. Urland presented the court
with an analogous situation, though rather than fraud, the underlying
tort involved the manufacture and distribution of a defective drug.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the "actual knowledge"
standard in Smith, it is reasonable to assert that the Third Circuit should
have applied the same standard in Urland.
The majority also relied on Deemer v. Weaver8" to support its finding
that the "knew or should have known" standard was applicable. How-
ever, this reliance appears to have been misplaced since language in
Deemer indicates that "actual knowledge" is the appropriate standard.8 6
The Deemer court adopted the principle set forth in Schwab v. Cornell:
If the circumstances are such that a man's eyes should have
been open to what is occurring, then the statute begins to run
from the time when he could have seen, but if by concealment,
through fraud or otherwise, a screen has been erected by his
adversary which effectually obscures the view of what has hap-
pened, the statute remains quiescent until actual knowledge
arises.8
7
Finally, in another case cited by the majority, Schaffer v. Lanelere,8 8 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared confused with regard to which
standard to apply in cases involving fraudulent concealment. On the
one hand the court stated, "[i]f, however, through fraud or conceal-
ment, the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate
from his right of inquiry, the defendant is estoppedfrom invoking the bar of
the limitation of action .... ,89 While on the other hand, the Schaffer court
subsequently stated that, "if it is true ... that the defendants deliber-
ately concealed the facts incident to the cause of decedent's death and
that the plaintiff could not through the use of reasonable diligence have ascer-
tained these facts, this would bar the defendants from invoking the defense
of the statute." 90 The court's latter statement supports the "knew or
should have known" standard; its former statement supports a standard
of permanent estoppel which is even more generous to the plaintiff than
the "actual knowledge" standard. Therefore, rather than buttressing
the majority's position, Schaffer appears to further confuse the Penn-
sylvania law on fraudulent concealment.
The principal case cited by Judge Becker in his dissent was Nesbitt v.
85. 324 Pa. 85, 187 A. 215 (1936). For a discussion of Deemer, see supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
86. 822 F.2d at 1280 (Becker, J., dissenting).
87. 324 Pa. at 88-89, 187 A. at 216 (quoting Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa.
536, 539, 160 A. 449, 450 (1932) (emphasis added).
88. 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963). For a discussion of Schaffer, see supra
note 40.
89. Id. at 405, 189 A.2d at 269 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 406, 187 A.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
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Erie Coach Co. ,91 in which the plaintiff was injured while a passenger on
the defendant's bus. 92 Thereafter, the defendant's agents misled the
plaintiff, causing her to believe that a settlement would be reached as
soon as all the facts had been gathered. 93 After the statute of limitations
had run, the plaintiff became apprised of the situation, and she sought to
bring an action to recover for her injuries. The Nesbitt court determined
that the defendant had "lulled [the plaintiff] into a sense of false security
as to the timely institution of her action." 94 Under such circumstances,
the court decided that the principle set forth in Schwab requiring "actual
knowledge" was applicable. 9 5 Thus, the Nesbitt court felt that the de-
fendant should pay a price for misleading the plaintiff as to her cause of
action-that price being the application of the "actual knowledge" stan-
dard. That same principle ought to have been applied in Urland where
the court presumed that Merrel-Dow had misled the Urlands regarding
the probability that Bendectin had played a role in Julie Beth's birth
defect. Furthermore, the Nesbitt decision should have been accorded
greater weight by the Urland court since it was a more recent decision
than all of the principal cases cited by the majority. 9 6
Aside from the above mentioned statement excerpted from the
Schwab case, which embraces the "actual knowledge" standard in fraudu-
lent concealment cases, the Schwab decision also indirectly supports the
application of that standard in Urland. Because the plaintiff in Schwab
had in his possession the title policy which stated that taxes were a lien
against which the title was not insured, it would have been appropriate
for the court, on those facts, to apply the "knew or should have known"
standard. 9 7 The plaintiff could have discovered the conveyancer's mis-
take by simply reading the title policy. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, specifically found that "actual knowledge" was the
proper standard.9 8
As the discussion above indicates, there is ample precedent in Penn-
sylvania caselaw for application of the "actual knowledge" standard in
fraudulent concealment cases such as Urland. Although the principal
cases are not entirely in accord on this point, those which appear to sup-
port a "knew or should have known" standard are generally older cases
or ones involving fraud as opposed to fraudulent concealment. Addi-
tionally, public policy clamors for the application of the "actual knowl-
91. 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964). For a discussion of Nesbitt, see supra
note 24.
92. Id. at 92, 204 A.2d at 474.
93. Id. at 93-95, 204 A.2d at 475-76.
94. Id. at 97, 204 A.2d at 477.
95. For a statement of that principle, see supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
96. 822 F.2d at 1279, n.5 (Becker, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1279 (Becker, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
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edge" standard against the "knew or should have known" standard.99
Although a federal court sitting in diversity is not free to substitute its
policy for that of the state,' 0 0 it is worth noting that application of the
"knew or should have known" standard carries with it a rather undesir-
able effect. Because a defendant is not faced with an additional penalty
for engaging in fraudulent concealment, he is encouraged to do so in an
attempt to avoid liability.' 0 ' Consequently, the extra burden created by
the defendant's act of fraudulent concealment falls upon the plaintiff.
Not only must the plaintiff discover the underlying tort, but he also must
uncover the defendant's efforts to conceal that tort without the benefit
of the more equitable "actual knowledge" standard.' 0 2 The application
of the "actual knowledge" standard would avoid those evils by shifting
the burden of engaging in fraudulent concealment to the defendant and
thereby discouraging him from engaging in it. 0 3
In view of the case law favoring the application of the "actual knowl-
edge" standard, it would appear that if Urland had arisen in the Penn-
sylvania state courts, the "actual knowledge" standard would have been
applied. This is particularly true in light of the strong public policy of
discouraging parties from engaging in fraudulent concealment.
Although Pennsylvania may not share this policy concern, there is noth-
ing in the cases indicating this to be true. In addition, the cases ex-
amined have not revealed any inconsistent policy concern. Therefore,
even though a federal court is not free to substitute its policy for that of
the state's, the Urland court may have chosen the more appropriate stan-
dard if it had reviewed the Pennsylvania cases in light of the above pol-
icy. In any event, if the court had analyzed the caselaw with closer
scrutiny, it would have concluded that "actual knowledge" is the appro-
priate standard in cases of fraudulent concealment. Had this conclusion
been reached, not only would justice have been done between Merrell-
Dow and Julie Beth Urland, but a sounder policy would have prevailed.
Michael F. Brown
99. Id. at 1280 (Becker, J., dissenting).
100. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 69, 78 (1938). The Erie court
stated that, "[eixcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Id.
101. 822 F.2d at 1281 (Becker, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1280 (Becker, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1281 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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